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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, comparative analysis of the processes behind the social development of 
Catholic and Muslim nationalist identities in Northern Ireland and the Palestinian 
territories respectively is undertaken. This is designed to try to enhance levels of 
understanding about the maintenance and duration of nationalist conflicts and ultimately 
the likelihood of resolution. Particular attention is placed on the social processes that 
recreate and reinforce 'common histories' and religio-nationalist identities. Important 
commonalities are identified including the role of historical memories, religious 
institutions, education, family members and peers in transmitting messages and images 
about the 'other' and physical divides that collectively contribute to geographical and 
social demarcation. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Considerable research has been undertaken into the multifarious religious, historical, 
economic and political reasons behind the nationalisation of Northern Irish Catholics and 
Palestinian Muslims. Comparative analysis between the social processes through which their 
collective identities develop and are internalised have been neglected. This paper seeks to 
contribute to addressing this neglect by examining the social development of religio-
nationalist identities and the interwoven ‘common histories.’ Particular attention is placed 
upon processes that result in the social development and transmission of historical memories 
and the roles of religious institutions, schools, family members and peers in connecting with 
the past, explaining the present and providing solutions for the future. To establish the 
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significance of history, the paper examines the evolution of the conflicts. There is not the 
scope to undertake this exploration in depth; instead a brief review of the major developments 
which have remained instrumental or became repositioned within modern settings is 
provided. More detailed readings are recommended for any reader wishing to gain a more 
thorough knowledge. Catholic and Muslim experiences in Northern Ireland and the 
Palestinian territories respectively, are explored throughout. Important commonalities are 
identified, including the role of similar socialising agents in transmitting messages and 
images about the 'other', physical divides that collectively contribute to geographical and 
social demarcation and the impact of ‘legitimising’ factors. Yet despite these similarities, the 
peace process in Northern Ireland has become widely accepted within the province while few 
are confident that the conflict over the Palestinian territories will be resolved in the 
foreseeable future. Developing upon the preceding points, the paper concludes by identifying 
the significant differences in the social development of common identities and feelings of 
belonging that have been instrumental in these different outcomes. 
 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL IDENTITIES 
 
Without wishing to engage heavily in the primordialist1 and modernist2 debate, this 
section aims to explore the development of Western societies, nationalism and subsequently 
other nation-states. The modern nation-state is strongly associated with industrial 
modernisation and the associated processes of technological advancement, growth of 
commerce, urbanisation, rapid expansion of bureaucracy, the division of labour and increased 
literacy. Modernists like, Anderson (2006), argue the development of ‘print capitalism’ was 
instrumental in ‘national consciousness.’ However if printed material was to become so 
influential, it had to be accompanied with growing rates of literacy, which required 
educational programmes. Through the widespread introduction of schools’ curricula and other 
forms of socialisation, national identity was diffused throughout the designated region 
(Halliday 2000). Crucially, for modernists, despite the modern nature of national identities, 
these forms of consciousness share a sense of collective belonging that is connected to the 
past. The extent to which this past is mythologized is part of the debate within the studies of 
nationalism, but for the purposes of this chapter the accuracy is secondary. For this study, the 
primary importance is allocated to the W.I. Thomas (1928) maxim, if people think a situation 
is real then it is real in its consequences. This study is much more concerned with the 
processes through which people connect with ‘historical memories’ rather than their accuracy 
and extent of selection, reformulation and fabrication. Nevertheless there is considerable 
evidence to suggest that the events that are described occurred; the precision of the 
interpretations and their significance maybe somewhat more contested. Across the debate 
within nationalist studies, it is generally agreed that collective consciousness around a 
‘nation’ was solidified through symbols and narratives with the printed history of the nation 
which connected the past and present, the living and dead, around discrete parameters. For 
                                                        
1 Primordialism is most commonly associated with Shils (1957) and Geertz (1963). 
2 Anderson (2006) is the foremost proponent of the modernist approach.  A discussion of the academic struggle 
over the origins of nationalism can be found within (Guibernau 2004, Halliday 2000, Smith 1991, 2003) 
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Smith (2003) these interconnections are essential: people’s perceptions of the past are 
instrumental to them understanding the present. If perceptions are to be widely shared and 
part of a collective consciousness, a common history is required that revolves around 
memories of battles, poets, heroes and heroines, and very often a ‘Golden Age’. This is a 
period that is considered to consist of culture, religion, moral purpose and knowledge which 
are drawn upon in the present. For groups encountering oppression or division, these 
connections to ‘historical memories’ are crucial and can be noticed in nationalist attempts to 
generate popular support for independence by emphasising a cultural legacy, national 
characteristics and associated territory (Dieckhoff 2005).  
Because of the strong association between nationalism and Western modernity, there is a 
tendency to only categorise secular groups as nationalists, even though there are innumerable 
examples of religious organisations who share common consciousness around the concept of 
a ‘nation’ with defined boundaries. Religio nationalist groups are also proficient at connecting 
with the past with the intended additional benefit of theological justification. For example, 
militant Islamic groups emphasise the origins of Islam and the activities and rhetoric of 
Muhammed and the four caliphs and their consequences when the religion quickly developed 
to become the dominant regional power. Contrary to McCrone (1998, discussed below) 
militants tend to emphasise the primacy of their designated discourse, and to which other 
loyalties e.g. family, gender, socio-economic, should be subsumed (Vertigans 2008b).  
Looked at from this perspective, Catholic and Islamic nationalism or transnationalism 
discourse associated with ‘al-Qa’ida’ provides a sense of identity around an ‘imagined 
community’ that places emphasis upon shared similarity with others and distinctions from 
others. By implication, emphasis upon similarities as the basis for collective solidarity 
excludes the different ‘other,’ people, groups and ‘nations’ that do not possess the requisite 
characteristics. As Mennell (2007: 40) suggests, ‘the intellectual and emotional construction 
of a group’s “we-image” and “we-feelings” always takes place in tandem with the 
construction of a “they-image” about some other group or groups of people, and with the 
development of feelings about them.’ This process is also accompanied by explicit 
denunciation of the ‘other’, whether Jews, Protestants, Israelis, Westerners or ‘Brits’ or even 
moderate nationalists or Muslims. Yet this behaviour is consistent with and shares similarities 
to the historical involvement of earlier applications of their discourse within struggles against 
colonial control.  
At this point, it should be emphasised that the national identities are not simply a 
consequence of the application of history to the present day. On the contrary, nationalism has 
to connect with contemporary experiences. Consequently collective loyalties that are 
prominent today within Palestinian and Northern Irish religious and nationalist groups are 
partly a consequence of recent developments within societies, international relations and 
processes of globalisation. Socialisation processes, for example through peers and the media, 
are utilised by groups to try to shift levels of allegiance and belief and often embed the heroes 
and sacrifices of the ‘Golden Age’ within contemporary discourse. Nevertheless despite 
considerable efforts to integrate nationalist loyalties, identities remain diverse. This is not 
unusual. McCrone (1998: 183) suggests that ‘the power of nationalism in the modern world 
lies in its capacity to reconfigure personal identities and loyalties in a way more in tune with 
the social, cultural and political realities… .’ But this is not to state that nationalism is 
inevitably the paramount form of identity. Instead McCrone acknowledges that nationalism 
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may not have priority over multiple identities and other forms of social identity like socio-
economic class or gender.  
Within both Northern Ireland and the Palestinian territories, and it should be stressed, 
other parts of the world, people hold a multitude of beliefs and loyalties with different forms 
of behaviour that can overlap and yet be distinctive. For example, in both regions people 
belong to a range of collectivities, including religious, ethnic, national, gender and socio-
economic. There is, as Todd et al. (2006: 329) remark with regards to Northern Ireland, a 
complex national identity that incorporates hybridity and fluidity in identification. Some 
individuals have internalised values that support the use of violence on behalf of a struggle 
for independence. Examples in the case studies include the republican IRA and INLA and 
loyalist UVF and UFF in Northern Ireland3 and to varying degrees, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and 
Fatah in the Palestinian territories.4 In this sense, members of opposing groups may share 
views about the justification of violence and willingness to undertaken activities. Others 
within the same regions have abhorred acts of violence committed, the protagonists argue, on 
behalf of their community. Yet despite these differences it is being argued that people within 
the communities share common norms and values that provide them with a collective sense of 
identity and often part of a broader movement.5 Such people will also be differentiated 
through other collective groupings to which they belong and possibly disagree over aspects of 
group members’ identities. Through different forms of communication, shared activities and 
spatiality, commonalities and feelings of belonging develop and are transmitted across 
generations that revolve around existing characteristics, namely a combination of religious, 
ethnic and national loyalties. For the purposes of this study, across Catholics in Northern 
Ireland and Muslims in the Palestinian territories, there are shared, whether real or imagined, 
allegiances based upon aspects of religion, ethnicity, nationalism and/or encounters that 
contribute to feelings about who people are as individuals and groups. Such a collective 
framework for identification is meaningful to its members, providing reference points that are 
the basis for distinguishing between people who share these values and ‘others’ who do not. 
And the classifications frequently exaggerate both ‘flattering’ similarities between members 
and derogatory and distinctive characteristics of ‘others’. Barth (1969, 1981) develops the 
significance of this for ethnic identities, suggesting that messages about identity have to be 
accepted by both individual and ‘significant others’. And on the reverse of this identification, 
                                                        
3 Republican groups are defined as those that used violence in order to achieve a united Ireland, loyalists are 
organisations using violence to prevent a united Ireland and generally to remain part of the United Kingdom. 
4 Both Hamas and Islamic Jihad are associated with militant forms of Islam.  Hamas is currently the elected 
‘governing’ party within the territories, although power tends to be concentrated within the Gaza Strip, and has 
a military wing, the al-Qassam Brigades.  Islamic Jihad tends to concentrate upon military activities.  The 
Fatah Party, until recently the dominant party, is more secular, placing greater emphasis upon more secular 
forms of nationalism (Frisch 2005).  Nevertheless the party is associated with the al-Aqsa Brigade which 
Cunningham (2003) and Saikal (2003) note, utilises Islamic rhetoric and symbols, thereby blurring the 
religious/secular divide.  Further details can be found in Abu-Amr (1994), Esposito (2002), Tamimi (2007) 
and Vertigans (2008a).  
5 Within the Palestinian territories, the struggle for independence is increasingly associated with Islam, albeit with 
differing interpretations and practice, often broken down by allegiance to the political parties and groups 
discussed in footnote 4.  In Northern Ireland, there have been two distinct broad, opposing movements.  The 
Unionists generally seek to retain the status of the province as part of the United Kingdom and are 
overwhelmingly Protestant.  Across the spectrum of Unionism, most people do not use violence but the more 
extreme level would include loyalists.  By comparison, nationalists seek a unified Ireland and are 
predominantly Catholic.  Again most people have not used violence but the broader movement includes 
republicans who share similar goals with different means of attaining them.  
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Cohen (1986) argues that groups are also categorised by ‘outsiders’ which contributes to a 
strengthening of boundaries and inner loyalties and external distancing. Therefore, as will be 
discussed later, how the group is considered and categorising by the ‘other’ will impact upon 
collective identities.  
In demarcated territories, mutual identifications, categorisations and reinforcements are 
quickly apparent within physical and psychological barriers. Within these environments, 
history, which is always embedded within collective memories, becomes even more 
significant. As Jenkins (2004: 26) elucidates, ‘the past is a particularly important resource 
upon which to draw in interpreting the here and now and forecasting the future.’ In situations 
where that history is associated with ‘grave injustice’ narratives reverberate throughout 
environments. Consequently children have been growing up within these communities, 
immersed within social relations and activities that are embedded with images, symbols and 
the narrative of collective identities, highlighting common descent, injustices and value 
orientations. And the criterion for group membership becomes a form of social constraint, 
heavily influencing individuals’ beliefs and behaviour in both their relations within the group 
and perceptions and interactions with the ‘other’. To behave in a manner in which the ‘other’ 
was considered the ‘same’ would challenge the foundations on which the group was based 
and, without shifting allegiances, would make continued membership difficult and could, in 
certain situations, result in punishment. This explanatory and experiential framework 
becomes the basis for individual and collective identification and the categorisation of the 
‘other’.  
Before the social development of these frameworks within the respective regions is 
outlined, it is important to discuss the approach to identity formation that is being applied. My 
starting point is that identity forms through social interaction in processes that are both 
intentional and unintentional. We may wish for children, employees, students or citizens to be 
responsible, trustworthy, hard working, humane individuals and instigate methods and 
institutions that are designed to cultivate people with these characteristics. However beyond 
extreme instances of isolation and incarceration, socialisation can never be completely 
controlled and no agent irrespective of the extent of their power and authority can prevent 
interaction with other socialising agents. As Barth (1969) explains, identities are socially 
constructed during interaction within and across boundaries that are shared with other 
identities. Nor can any agent precisely determine the extent to which their messages will be 
internalised by individuals who will interpret the missives alongside those transmitted by 
family members, friends, work colleagues and the media. And of course, all these messages 
will also interact with the individual’s existing personality and levels of cognition.  
 
 
Historical Roots of Palestinian and Irish Catholic Collective Identities 
 
Both nationalist struggles are long-standing and considerable research6 has been 
undertaken into contributing economic and political factors. There is not the scope in this 
                                                        
6 Important texts include, for Northern Ireland, Bishop and Mallie (1988), Bruce (1992), Coogan (1995), Crawford 
(2003), Cusack and McDonald (1997), English (2003), McDonald and Cusack (2005), Moloney (2002), 
Taylor (1998 and 2000), Toolis (1995) and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Bregman and Jihan (1998), Cohn-
Sherbok and Dawood, (2003), Fraser (2007), Gresh and Vidal (1990), Oren (2002), Said (1994), Smith (2007) 
and Tessler (1994).    
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chapter to explore the issues in depth. Instead it is intended to provide enough information 
about the historical evolution of the conflicts in order to make recent violence and the role of 
common memories understandable. The analysis commences with Northern Ireland where 
multiple events have been symbolised, redefined to give meaning to the present, including for 
nationalists, the plantations, Potato or Great Famine, Bloody Sunday and Hunger Strikes and 
for unionists, King Billy, the Apprentice Boys and Bloody Friday. In terms of chronology, the 
struggles in Northern Ireland have the longest historical origins, arguably stemming from the 
twelfth century when King Henry II of England established control in an area close to Dublin. 
For the next four centuries, the English sought to impose their rule and by the sixteenth 
century, this had been achieved over large sections of the island. One area that was not under 
English control was the northern province of Ulster. To strengthen their dominance over the 
region, the Plantation of Ulster was introduced in 1609 which encouraged predominantly 
Protestants from England, Scotland and Wales to migrate. The migrants were attracted by the 
promise of land with previous Catholic landowners exiled to the mountains or less fertile 
ground. From this point, the Protestants were competing for limited resources with the 
indigenous Catholics who were disadvantaged by the implementation of discriminatory penal 
laws which favoured the migrants (Bishop and Mallie 1988, Coogan 1995). This quickly led 
to the physical and psychological separation of the two ‘communities’ which was reinforced 
by different languages and cultural pastimes. Both sides viewed the ‘other’ negatively; 
Catholics, resentful about the loss of their territory, periodically rebelled, while Protestants 
lived in fear of attack. In 1800 the relationship between Britain and Ireland was formalised in 
the Act of Union which allocated responsibility for the governing of Ireland to the British 
Parliament. Despite the ongoing discrimination, most notoriously during the 1840s famine, 
and early republican groups aiming for independence, including the United Irishmen, the 
Fenians and Irish Republican Brotherhood, the union remained in place over one hundred 
years later. Nevertheless it was becoming apparent to the British government that concessions 
were required in order to quell republicanism. Although these failed to overcome 
discriminatory practices, Protestants were concerned that their advantages were being 
threatened and formed their own military groups.  
When Home Rule for Ireland was proposed, the island was to be granted its own 
parliament with the power to govern within the broader British framework, unionist concerns 
rose dramatically, resulting in the formation of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) to resist the 
forecasted Irish independence. However with the intervention of the First World War, the 
UVF enlisted as a division in the British Army and many of their soldiers were killed, 
especially during the 1916 Battle of the Somme. In the same year, Sinn Féin, at that time a 
small republican group, led by Padraig Pearse and James Connolly, seized the General Post 
Office and declared themselves to be the provisional government of the new republic. The 
Easter Rising, as it became known, was not widely supported, was badly planned and quickly 
defeated. A number of republicans were killed and some of the leaders including Pearse and 
Connolly were executed. At the time Pearse predicted that through their willingness to 
sacrifice themselves for a united Ireland they would be ‘remembered by posterity and blessed 
by unborn generations’ (Bishop and Mallie 1988: 26). This was to prove prescient because 
the rebellion and the British reaction raised levels of awareness about republicanism and 
support for Sinn Féin increased. And when general elections were held, after the end of the 
war, the party won an overwhelming majority of seats in the island and abstained from 
attending Westminster. Seemingly with a popular mandate, an Irish Parliament was 
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established and a declaration of independence issued. This was rejected by the British and 
Irish unionists and between 1919 and 1921 the Anglo-Irish war was fought. Ultimately the 
war ended in a stalemate and a settlement was agreed that in 1922 portioned Ireland into 
Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State.7 The former was to consist of six counties in the 
north east that were part of the county of Ulster which had previously consisted of nine. By 
selecting six counties where Protestants were a majority, unlike in the excluded areas, 
Protestant dominance was guaranteed and Britain retained ultimate control. The remaining 26 
counties of the island became part of the republic. Initially the division was not universally 
accepted by nationalists and a civil war ensued between the Irish government military and the 
Irish Republican Army (IRA). With limited popular support, the IRA lost and became 
marginalised within Irish politics. Yet the matter of a unified and independent island was not 
discarded, indeed there was a widespread belief based in part upon the Government of Ireland 
Act, passed by the British Government, that an Irish parliament for the whole island would be 
established.  
After partition, the demarcation boundaries promptly became embedded and optimism 
that a united island could be achieved peacefully began to disappear. The geographical 
division was also instrumental in the fracture of Irish nationalism. Morag (2008) comments 
on the different impact of being an overwhelming majority having autonomy to create 
national identity through state institutions in the ‘south’ and experiences in the ‘north’ where 
people were part of a minority subjected to British and Protestant control. Unsurprisingly in 
these contexts, very different forms of Irish nationalism developed, with militarism 
increasingly stemming from the northern counties. The IRA sought to connect to the 
diminished hopes and organised violent campaigns between the 1920s and 1960s. During the 
1930s, the struggle with the republican government which had lingered after the civil war, 
was formally ended and subsequent campaigns concentrated upon British and Northern Irish 
targets. Throughout this period, the IRA proved ineffective and after the failure of their 
Border Campaign (1956-62), the group de-militarised and concentrated upon Marxist 
ideology and discursive consciousness. The lack of popular support for armed conflict should 
not however be construed as Catholic popular support for the Northern Irish construct. 
Catholics remained discriminated against across political representation, employment, 
housing and human rights. In order to address the rising Catholic protests, which connected 
into growing awareness of ethnic and egalitarian tensions in other parts of the world, a 
number of concessions were made by the Northern Ireland government (Bruce 1992, Coogan 
1995). Overall, the concessions were part of an approach that had raised Catholic hopes that 
were not fulfilled, described by Moloney (2002: 53) as ‘cosmetic, patronizing, and at times 
insulting’. Feeling that electoral politicians were not going to deliver structural reforms, many 
Catholics chose to participate within the burgeoning civil demonstrations that were to become 
incorporated within the civil rights movement led by the Northern Irish Civil Rights 
Association. Conversely, Unionists were fearful about the implications both of the 
concessions and the mobilisation within NICRA which largely attracted Catholic support 
despite many Protestants sharing similar experiences. The association of NICRA with 
sectarianism8 resulted in confrontation between the demonstrators, the Royal Ulster 
                                                        
7 The Free State was nominally a part of the British Empire until 1949 when it became a Republic. 
8 Contrary to this popular perception, the movement only campaigned on civil rights issues (Disturbance in 
Northern Ireland). 
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Constabulary and protesting unionists. Rallies became scenes of violence between the 
competing groups and spiralled to rioting, intimidation, firebombing and house burning, often 
engaging children (Cairns 1987). Attacks were particularly venomous in mixed residential 
areas where the minority group, both Catholic and Protestant, were forced to leave, creating 
thousands of refugees who relocated to their ‘own’ communities for security and lack of other 
alternatives. These experiences were to contribute to the radicalisation of the respective 
communities, and recruitment to the emerging paramilitary groups increased rapidly 
(Fairweather et al. 1984, MacDonald 1991, Taylor 1998, 2000).  
Levels of violence escalated in part due to developments catching the British government 
by surprise; a problem that was magnified by the lack of attention that had been placed upon 
the province. Subsequently this meant that there was inadequate understanding about the 
nature of the problems and a range of ill-advised policies was introduced that further inflamed 
the troubles. When British troops were deployed to assist the RUC who were failing to 
control the violence, it has been well documented that Catholics were supportive, considering 
the army an important means to achieving peace. This perception was influenced by the 
relative weakness of the IRA who struggled to react following their disarmament in 1962. 
Following an internal disagreement over the use of violence, the organisation split into two 
groups, the Official IRA who wanted to concentrate upon democratic solutions and the 
Provisional IRA “the Provos” who argued that the armed struggle must be allocated 
prominence. As the Provos became dominant and the British army was increasingly 
considered to be invasive and pro-Unionist, feelings changed. Now the Provos were 
becoming embedded within communities, patrolling streets, leading Martin Meehan, an IRA 
leader, to declare that the role in defending Catholic areas legitimised the paramilitaries,9 
because ‘the whole broad spectrum of nationalist people actually supported what the IRA 
were doing.’10 The extent to which the whole community supported the paramilitaries is 
somewhat contestable. Nevertheless there does appear to be a widespread belief that neither 
the police nor the army could be relied upon to protect Catholics against loyalist attacks. 
Therefore the IRA rose in prominence to become viewed as defenders of the community. By 
comparison, the British military were considered to be part of the problem, unfairly imposing 
unjust restraints; an obstacle to a united Ireland.  
Republican and loyalists sectarian emphasis upon the requirement for defence 
unsurprisingly contributed to a strengthening of community unity and collective 
effervescence in the face of fear, threats and attack, arguably in the name of communal 
protection. At the same time that people like Brendan Hughes were joining the IRA because 
‘we had to do something to protect ourselves with … I wanted to be involved too because our 
whole community felt that we were under attack,’11 opposing loyalist paramilitaries like 
William Smith ‘believed that if loyalists did not take on that [proactive] role, then eventually 
the Provos would have their way because the British government would just bow to the 
pressure.’12 Thus a vicious circle emerged of attack and retaliation where loyalists felt 
threatened by the rising numbers of, and activities by, Republican paramilitaries and felt 
                                                        
9 In Northern Ireland, members of the armed groups were called, although by no means universally, 
‘paramilitaries’.  This term is used throughout while acknowledging that for many people, these are 
‘terrorists’.  
10 Meehan is quoted in Taylor (1998: 74). 
11 Hughes is quoted in Taylor (1998:53). 
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unable to trust the British army and government which led to more people joining loyalist 
groups. Concomitantly increasing actions by, and support for, loyalist groups and a deepening 
distrust and hatred of the British army, contributed to growing recruitment to the IRA. Levels 
of support grew still further after ‘Bloody Sunday’ when the British Parachute Regiment shot 
dead 13 civilians in January 1972. This event became hugely symbolic, with many joining the 
republicans in the emotive aftermath (Bishop and Mallie 1988, Coogan 1995, Moloney 2002, 
Taylor 1998). Later that year, the IRA killed nine people in a serious of explosions on what 
became known as ‘Bloody Friday’ and was equally influential in the mobilisation of recruits 
to loyalist groups (Crawford 2003, Cusack and McDonald 1997, Dillon 2004 and McDonald 
and Cusack 2005). Within this environment, retaliation became the tactic of both sides, 
although it was not always apparent who had committed the initial attack.  
The escalation of violence obviously impacted upon communities and feelings of conflict 
fatigue became notable. Some among the IRA leadership began to question the effectiveness 
of the violent campaign and called a truce. During this period, republicans began to negotiate 
with the British government while the loyalists fearing British concessions continued with 
their campaign. However the peace talks failed to achieve progress and from 1976 the 
republicans re-introduced the campaign of violence. 1976 was also notable because of the 
removal of the ‘special status’ category of paramilitary prisoners in order to criminalise rather 
than politicise. Over the longer term, the policy was to be instrumental in the formulation of a 
new type of republican politics which became prominent during, and particularly in the 
aftermath of, the Hunger Strikes. Following the changed status, attention shifted away from 
military operations to the prisons. Republican prisoners imprisoned after the policy had been 
introduced, rejected the criminalised status and initially refused to wear prison clothes. 
Instead the prisoners clothed themselves in blankets, a practice that became known as living 
‘on the blanket’. The campaign became extended into the ‘dirty protest’ when republicans 
prisoners refused to wash and smeared excrement on the walls of their cells. Considerable 
media and public attention was attracted by these actions which were to gradually diminish. 
After four years it was decided that a new approach was required and the hunger strikes were 
introduced. The first strike commenced in 1980 and although it was driven by secular 
demands, the symbolism of sacrifice and fasting connected with, and interwove, republican 
and Catholic history (Coulter 1999, Fairweather et al. 1984 and McKeown 2001). On 
believing that the British government would be making necessary concessions the strike was 
ended without loss of life. However the concessions failed to materialise and a second fast 
began in 1981 led by Bobby Sands. Shortly after he first refused food, Frank Maguire, the 
nationalist MP for Fermanagh-South Tyrone died and there was considerable debate within 
the republican movement over contesting the vacant seat. Eventually it was agreed to 
nominate Bobby Sands and to campaign on the prisoners’ demands. Sands was duly elected 
and his victory, alongside the symbolism and sacrifice of the hunger strike, reignited 
nationalism. In total ten men died in the hunger strike commencing with Sands. His death 
attracted massive media attention and his funeral was attended by tens of thousands of 
mourners. However the strike’s impact diminished with each death and when nationalist 
support for them decreased and some families authorised medical attention, in October 1981, 
                                                                                                                                                       
12 Smith is quoted in Taylor (2000: 79). 
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they were stopped. The prisoners’ demands had not been met13 but by this stage the 
significance of the strike went way beyond prison boundaries. Impressed by the strikers’ 
dedication and sacrifice, support for the republican movement was energised and many new 
recruits joined the IRA and INLA (Irish National Liberation Army who were also represented 
in the strike). In addition to the mobilising of armed members, the strike was also 
instrumental in the politicisation of the nationalist struggle and the twin track approach of 
‘armalite and ballot box’. Finally global media coverage was instrumental in 
internationalising the conflict, arousing awareness and support, especially among Irish 
Catholic Americans, and increasing criticism of the British approach.  
Conversely the roots of peace were firmly planted at this time, although few would have 
confidently declared this. During the strike, support for loyalist groups had also risen with 
new members and former paramilitaries rejoining. As Billy Giles, a UVF member, stated, 
‘Protestants were fearful of what was going to happen… . They feared there was going to be 
an uprising and they were all going to be slaughtered … . Many of us who had left, came 
back.’ The opposing paramilitaries continued to engage in their perceived retaliatory actions 
and the IRA pursued attacks against British targets, including most notoriously in 1984 
blowing up the Brighton hotel where the governing Conservative Party were staying. 
Nevertheless, over time the seemingly endless cycle of violence and lack of any obvious 
progress contributed to feelings of conflict fatigue. This had a particular impact upon the 
republicans who were facing more concerted loyalist attacks and effective counter-terror 
tactics by the British army. Consequently when the Enniskillen bomb detonated prematurely 
killing civilians and causing widespread Protestant and Catholic anger, the republicans’ 
position had been significantly weakened and they could not rely on uncritical community 
support for the continuation of the violent struggle. And with the British government also 
encountering public opposition and a desire to end the conflict, peace talks commenced, 
initially clandestinely and then openly culminating in the Good Friday Agreement (Taylor 
1998). Despite stalemates, tortuously slow progress at times and continuing paramilitary 
activities, the peace has largely held.  
Disputes between Palestinian Muslim, Christian14 and Jews became prominent in the 
aftermath of the First World War. Prior to this time period, as Mansfield (1978) points out, 
the region was not a geographical or political entity with defined borders. Yet before the 
region became immersed in local, national and international tensions, relations between Arab 
Muslims, Christians and Jews had been relatively harmonious. Neither religion nor 
nationalism were prominent sources of conflict, with different religious denominations 
sharing common identification with a sense of ‘Arabness’. However through integrated 
processes, tensions and national and religio ethnic identities emerged, solidified and became 
embedded over the first half of the twentieth century and have not improved since.  
Demographic data for the period is lacking and studies have tended to rely upon 
estimates. Before 1914, there was calculated to be 600,000 Arab Muslims and Christians and 
60,000 Jews. With the formation of the Zionist movement, led by Theodor Herzl, in the late 
nineteenth century, the demand for a home in the ‘Land of Zion’ became pronounced, 
                                                        
13 Gradually and covertly paramilitary prisoners were subsequently granted special privileges that may have 
satisfied the hunger strikers. 
14 In 2006 there was an estimated 205,000 Palestinian Arab Christians (CIAa and b) or approximately five percent 
of the population, overwhelmingly concentrated in the West Bank.  This paper focuses upon Palestinian 
Muslims. 
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although disputed within Judaism. Zionist activities became more noticeable, with Jewish 
businessmen spending millions of dollars in purchasing land and property, often from Arab 
and Turkish absentee landlords (Armstrong 2004) and developing communities. Relations 
between Arabs and Jews deteriorated. At this time, the region was governed by the Ottoman 
Empire who fought unsuccessfully alongside Germany and Austria-Hungary in the First 
World War. During the war, the victorious allies put forward three contradictory proposals in 
the event of the Ottomans being defeated and losing this territory: 
 
1. The 1916 Syke-Picot agreement that was to dismember the Ottoman land. Part of 
Palestine was to be controlled by the British with the remainder controlled by a joint 
Allied government; 
2. In order to attract Arab support in the war, Britain agreed to support Arab demands 
for independence;  
3. Finally, the 1917 Balfour Declaration introduced the establishment of a ‘Jewish 
national homeland in Palestine’ with British backing. 
 
At the end of the war, Britain gained a mandate over Palestine and the wider area, 
Transjordan, which was to gain independence as Jordan.  
In 1918, a British census calculated that there were 700,000 Muslims and 56,000 Jews. 
Jewish immigration rose and by 1931 stood at 175,000 and surged during the 1930s, partly in 
reaction to developments in Germany and rising levels of anti-semiticism15 Gradually 
reciprocal suspicion and fear of the two increasingly distinctive communities rose and the 
scale of violence escalated throughout the 1930s and 1940s. To try and resolve the conflict 
and address humanitarian and moral concerns that arose following the defeat of Germany in 
the Second World War, a resolution was passed by the United Nations to divide Palestine into 
two nation-states; Arab and Israeli. The former rejected the proposal which was accepted by 
the latter and in 1948 an independent state of Israel was declared and the British withdrew. 
Neighbouring Arab nations, Egypt, Jordan and Syria, under the pretext of saving the 
Palestinians16, fought the first war with Israel and lost in 1949. Israel’s victory led to an 
increase in Israeli territory and the end of the proposed Palestinian state with the remaining 
territory becoming the responsibility of Egypt and Jordan. At this point, 716, 678 Jews lived 
in what had become Israel compared to 1.3 million Muslims and Christians who lived within 
the previous Palestinian boundaries of whom over 700,000 were now refugees.17 
The extent of the Jewish migration is highlighted by Behar (2007) who reports that over 
90 per cent of Jews living in Israel at this time were of European origin. And in an interesting 
comparison, Behar observes that Jews who were living in the Middle East did not have 
similar experiences to recent European co-religion migrants, like racism, xenophobia and 
pogroms. In addition, European Zionism was formulated on Eurocentric principles that did 
not engage with non European Jews. Consequently and somewhat ironically there was a much 
less developed sense of a national Jewish consciousness in the region that became Israel. 
Cross cutting loyalties could also be noticed within the majority of ‘Arabized-Jews’ who 
lived in other parts of the Middle East, and continued to do so after 1948, although by this 
                                                        
15 Figures provided in Mansfield (1978). 
16 Although there are clear indications that the Arab forces had their own designs on the land.   
17 Reported in Behar (2007). 
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stage, Arab nationalism was becoming consolidated and embedded with anti-Jewish 
sentiments.  
Following the loss of land and the absorption of the remaining territory, Palestinians 
initially believed that the international community would be mobilised by the magnitude of 
the perceived injustice they had encountered. Onus was therefore placed upon other nation-
states and agencies rectifying ‘the Catastrophe’ and restoring the territory and properties to 
the Palestinians. Additionally expectations were high that the Arab nation-states could resolve 
the problem, partly of their making, either through military conflict or diplomacy. These 
hopes were closely intertwined with the increasingly popular Arab nationalism during the 
1950s and 1960s. In some respects the restoration of ‘Palestine’ was subsumed within the 
broader framework for a unified Arab nation, to be led by the Egyptian leader, Gamal Abdel 
Nasser. However neither the international community nor Arab governments provided 
solutions that were acceptable to the Palestinians. Gradually, Palestinians decided that 
independence could only be achieved by the actions of Palestinians, a process that arguably 
formally commenced with the formation of Fatah in 1959 and whose founders, including 
Yasser Arafat, were to subsequently be instrumental in the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation (PLO) (Abdallah 2003, Halliday 2002, Saikal 2003). Towards the end of the 
1960s the shift in allegiance accelerated through growing dissatisfaction with secular 
nationalism that stemmed predominantly from the 1967 defeat by Israel of Arab forces from 
Egypt, Jordan and Syria. At the end of the war, Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan 
Heights, Gaza and the West Bank, with the latter two areas overwhelmingly occupied by 
Palestinians and considered part of the Palestinian nation-state in the 1947 intended 
demarcation. Following Israel’s victory, the United Nations passed a resolution calling for 
peace and the withdrawal of Israel from the land won in the war. Subsequently however 
prospects for peace, except for a period of optimism in the 1990s have been limited, and 
influenced by increasingly religious and nationalist political groups, Israel commenced its 
settlement policy18 which resulted in property being built for Jews on the disputed territory in 
Gaza and the West Bank. Confidence in outside forces was further diminished following the 
peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979 which undermined broader Arab unity on 
occupied territories.  
Perhaps surprisingly, as Tamimi (2007) observes, in the decade after Israel assumed 
responsibility for the now disputed Palestinian territory, in socio-economic terms, the 
Palestinian’s position, especially in Gaza, improved. Border controls were relatively lax, there 
were considerable higher paid employment opportunities in Israel and communications and 
transportation between the two separate Palestinian areas improved. Gradually however 
through interrelated developments like the introduction of the settlement policy, increased 
influence of the religio, right-wing in Israeli politics, rising Palestinian radicalism, most 
noticeable in terror groups like the PFLP, more invasive and restrictive controls and rising 
community surveillance, tensions became increasingly noticeable. 
Since 1967, there have been numerous attempts to attain peace, with the closest following 
the 1993 Oslo Peace Process. This agreement outlined that in return for the Palestinians 
recognising Israel as a nation-state, there would be a phased Israeli withdrawal from the 
territories. The most difficult issues, namely the creation of a Palestinian nation-state, the 
Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, the rights of refugees, the status of Jerusalem 
                                                        
18 The policy was not formally announced until 1977. 
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and the distribution of water were to be resolved during a five year interim period. Despite the 
principles being widely supported by most Palestinians (Oliver and Steinberg 2005, Tamimi 
2007) militant groups continued to attack Jewish targets. Simultaneously Jewish radicals were 
also mobilised by the ‘threat of peace’ and attacked Muslims19 and ultimately the Israeli 
Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, who had been instrumental in the process. The death of 
Rabin, against a backdrop of rising tensions and volatility on both sides was in many ways the 
end of the peace process. Subsequent Israeli leaders, Binyamin Netanyahu and Ehud Barak, 
met with Arafat under American-sponsored talks, but none of these leaders possessed the 
necessary political support to be able to address the outstanding difficult issues that were now 
becoming exacerbated by increased violence by Palestinian groups and the Israeli army and 
ongoing settlement building. Palestinian frustrations were to be more broadly translated into 
anger and militancy following the controversial visit by Ariel Sharon to the extremely 
sensitive al-Aqsa/Temple Mount complex, prior to his election as Israeli Prime Minister. 
Mass demonstrations followed and quickly escalated to the al-Aqsa intifada. Unlike the first 
intifada (1987-1993), which was initially a civilian uprising, the second intifada was 
dominated by militants. Violence and not diplomacy became the main method of 
communication with militants undertaking terror attacks, most prominently suicide bombs 
and Israel adopting a more militaristic approach and aggressive role for their armed forces. At 
the time of writing, the latest peace proposal, the ‘road map’ which provided a timetable for 
negotiation has been driven off the tracks and a stalemate ensues. The Israeli ‘wall’ built 
inside the West Bank for ‘security purposes’ is arguably proving successful in terms of 
limiting the number of suicide attacks. However the ‘wall’ is hugely controversial, not least as 
further Palestinian land has been claimed by Israel, local populations have been greatly 
inconvenienced and there is a suspicion that the barrier is part of a longer term strategy to 
demarcate the West Bank. With conditions deteriorating inside the territories, anger and 
resentment remain prominent, but with less opportunities to target Israel within the 
‘asymmetrical war’, loose allegiances that had formed around national consciousness are 
fracturing as traditional divides between Gaza and the West Bank, city dwellers, refugees and 
rural areas re-emerge. In the political arena, this is most noticeable in the violent disputes 
between Hamas and Fatah supporters and has contributed to a further undermining of national 
unity with neither group possessing sufficiently broad support in order to address the 
obstacles to peace.  
 
 
RELIGION IN THE TERRITORIES 
 
Religion within the Catholic and Muslim communities has become integral to their ethnic 
nationalism, a main determiner of status and loyalties and dividing factor from the ‘other.’ 
Both Islam and Catholicism have been able to evoke senses of the sacred and provide 
explanations, frameworks of meaning and theological justification for actions. Religious 
symbols, rituals, doctrinal teachings and organisations are instrumental in processes of ethnic 
identification. Similarly the prevalence of religion impacts upon the identity formations of 
Catholics and Muslims and their senses of collective belonging to the Palestinian or Irish 
                                                        
19 Prior to the death of Rabin, the most notable attack was undertaken by Baruch Goldstein who killed 29 Muslim 
worshippers in 1994. 
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“nation”. For the Catholics, since reformation religious denomination has been interwoven 
with Irish ethnicity as the main source of demarcation and basis for national identity. For the 
Palestinians emphasis was also placed upon Arab ethnic identity which has gradually 
diminished through greater religiosity which is increasingly bound with Palestinian 
nationalism. In these instances both Sunni20 Islam and Catholic Christianity and the struggles 
for independence can be described collectively as forms of ‘religio-nationalism’. The 
religious and ethnic values interconnected within this form of nationalism become, to varying 
degrees, integral components of supporters and activists’ identities, helping to shape their 
beliefs and behaviour (Vertigans 2008a).  
As in other parts of Western Europe, sectarianism in Ireland became an integral part of 
the society following the Reformation but unlike other regions, ‘the specific conditions of 
political and religious movements… resulted in ingrained communal divisions, where the 
lines of religious division ran almost parallel to political divisions’ (Morrow 1995: 153). By 
the nineteenth century, political divisions had been consolidated according to religious 
loyalties and today people are inclined to classify themselves according to religious 
denomination. Even older children and young adults, whose formative years have largely 
been more peaceful than other generations over the last 35 years, continue to overwhelmingly 
identify with being either ‘Catholic’ or ‘Protestant’ and around 80 per cent believe that 
religion will always impact upon how people in Northern Ireland consider each other (Young 
Life and Times Survey 2004, 2005).  
The influence of religion differs within the Catholic and Muslim communities. 
Catholicism has been a main source of collective identification in Northern Ireland, holding a 
symbolic role within the ‘Troubles’ as they are euphemistically called. Arguably the influence 
of religion upon identities, operating outside the interwoven relationship with nationalism 
and, impacting upon moral behaviour and political influence, has diminished as part of 
broader processes of secularisation and the secular nature of Northern Irish society. Yet a 
close relationship between religion and culture remains and Protestants continue to associate 
acts of violence by republicans and nationalist symbols with Catholicism whilst Catholics 
will make similar associations with loyalist attacks and unionist marches (Murray 1995). By 
comparison, Islam within the Palestinian territories has become more prominent, grounded 
within versions of history and growing in significance across religious, cultural, economic, 
legal and political spheres. Religious behaviour and support for political Islam has grown 
markedly since the 1980s. Today both Hamas, the leading religious organisation, governing 
party and, widely considered outside the territories, ‘terrorist’ group, and the more secular 
Fatah Party, utilise Islam to arouse nationalist support and justify actions.  
Contrary to popular perceptions of the region as being one dominated by religious 
allegiance, arguably religion did not become politicised until the aftermath of Israel’s victory 
in the 1967 war. Within Israel and the Jewish diaspora, many Jews considered the victory to 
be a sign from God of support for their endeavours and the captured territory, particularly the 
West Bank, was considered to be part of the biblical Land of Israel. Consequently the success 
of the secular military became interwoven with historical territory and the ‘Golden Age’ of 
Judaism, resulting in the strengthening of religious and nationalist ties. At a pragmatic level, 
Jews were relocated to the occupied land as part of the settlement programme. In the West 
Bank, settlements attained significance for political, economic and religious factors. The 
                                                        
20 The overwhelming majority of Palestinian Muslims belong to the Sunni denomination. 
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association with the Land of Israel has become embedded within perceptions of the territory, 
particularly amongst the ultra nationalist parties, making discussions about the withdrawal or 
deconstruction of the settlements hugely emotive. Within the Knesset there is neither the 
inclination nor authority to challenge this association and withdrawal looks extremely 
unlikely for the foreseeable future. 
For Muslims in the region, the war was also viewed through the prism of religion with 
very different conclusions drawn. Instead of their actions and political developments being 
considered to be legitimised by God, for many Muslims the defeat was the opposite: namely, 
that the humiliating loss proved the moral bankruptcy and inappropriateness of secular Arab 
nationalism, which was epitomised by the defeated Egyptian leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser. 
Contrary to the Jewish response, Muslims therefore considered the defeat to be the outcome 
of the weakness of Islam across Arab societies and concomitant attempts to modernise based 
upon Western models. The solution was therefore to be found with greater piety and 
integration of religion within the nation-state and civil society. Thus the 1967 war was to 
legitimise both Judaism and Islam.  
The widespread political shift to greater religiosity was not immediate. Secular structures 
remained, and largely remain, in place. Policies that were predominantly secular in intention 
continued to be implemented by Israeli governments and Palestinian movements. For the 
latter, defeat did not initially result in the same degree of mobilisation of religious sentiments 
that occurred in neighbouring parts of the Arab Middle East. This is in part because prior to 
the war, the primary representative of the Palestinians was the secular Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation (PLO). The PLO had been established by the Arab League in 1964 and was 
dominated by ‘Arabs’. After the 1967 war, younger Palestinians gained control and shifted 
the emphasis from the now discredited Arab to Palestinian nationalism. Even allowing for 
this, within these ‘secular’ groups and Israel, greater reliance was placed upon their respective 
religions to justify actions and to denounce the ‘other.’ This political utilisation of the 
religions connected into, and enhanced, rising levels of religiosity amongst the respective 
populations.  
During the period of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation’s (PLO) secular dominance, 
religious norms, values and practices continued to form the basis for many aspects of personal 
life and identities. By comparison, towards the latter stages of Yasser Arafat’s leadership 
(1969–2004), secular nationalism associated with Fatah and the then Palestinian Authority 
(PA) was undermined by a multitude of factors that included the failure of the peace process, 
and association with corruption, human rights’ violations, bureaucratic ineptitude and failing 
public services.21 The extension of religion from individual consciousness to political 
identification happened as people became disillusioned both with the PA’s policies and more 
broadly Arab nationalism. For the first time the conflict with Israel became Islamicised. 
Today, Hamas is the leading political party in the territories and Islam is central to individual, 
social and political behaviour. Within militant groups and government justifications of 
military actions or attempts at recruitment, religion and politics are entwined. Abu-Surur, a 
leading figure within Hamas, provides a good example of this interrelationship when 
outlining how Palestinians should ‘make our blood cheap for the sake of Allah and out of 
love for this homeland… in order that Palestine remains Islamic, and be liberated.’22 People 
                                                        
21 A more detailed discussion of these points can be found in Abu-Amr (1994), Reuter (2004). 
22 Abu-Suror is quoted in Oliver and Steinberg (2005). 
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are encouraged to die altruistically for religion and the homeland and egotistically for 
salvation (Pedahzur et al. 2003, Sutton and Vertigans 2005). And this use of religion to 
mobilise support and justify violence is not restricted to Islamic militant groups like Hamas 
and Islamic Jihad. For example, Frisch (2005: 398) notes how the main secular party within 
the Palestinian Authority, Fatah, ‘uses religious belief and emotion as a mobilizing tool on 
behalf of Palestinian nationalist goals… Fatah recognizes the significance of Islam as an 
important component of the collective identity and culture of Palestinians.’ The party is also 
linked to the al-Aqsa Brigade militant group that emerged during the second intifada. Despite 
these secular links, the group also utilises Islamic rhetoric and symbols as the basis for 
resistance (Saikal 2003) and as Cunningham (2003) notes the lines between secularists and 
Islamists have become blurred. 
By comparison Catholicism has been integral within Irish nationalism since the earlier 
stages of the conflict and the manner in which religious denomination was used to distinguish 
ethnicity and privilege. Both Catholic and the rival Unionist nationalisms have, as 
MacLaughlin (2001) has argued, provided real meaning for many ‘ordinary people’, 
informing attitudes towards identity, community and work. Kelly and Sinclair (2003) suggest 
that religious identity provides a strong basis for community or political affiliation. Religion 
is immersed within versions of Irish history, nationalist discourse and sacramental references 
with symbols noticeable within loyalist and republican rhetoric and murals. And in one of the 
most influential events of the Troubles, the republican prisoners’ hunger strikes, while 
ostensibly for secular demands, utilised the symbolism of sacrifice and fasting within 
nationalist history and Catholicism to enhance support and levels of legitimacy (McKeown 
2001, Fairweather et al 1984, O’Malley 1990). 
The ongoing impact of religion within Northern Ireland is noticeable within studies of 
rates for church attendance which is considerably higher than in other parts of the UK.23 But 
as Coulter (1999) points out the conflict is not primarily a Holy War as is widely perceived 
outside Northern Ireland. This is supported by research (Fairweather et al 1984, Toolis 1995, 
Mitchell 2006) into the perceptions of Protestants and Catholics who report making and 
remaining friends with the other denomination and stress that the conflict is political and 
economic and not religious. However as Coulter remarks, the involvement of religion should 
not be understated. While religion is not the cause of the troubles, ‘it has exercised a palpable 
influence. Religious belief and practice within the six counties have served to promote those 
secular identities and disputes that form the basis of the “Northern Ireland problem”’ (Coulter 
1999: 58). And both Catholic and Protestant nationalisms, and the history on which they are 
based, have utilised religion to provide legitimacy for sectarianism and the reinforcement of 
nationalist loyalties.  
In summary, therefore as McLaughlin et al. (2006: 599) remark with regards to the 
Northern Irish conflict but which also applies to Palestinian Muslim communal identities, 
religion acts as ‘a socially determined boundary. However religion is only one dimension of 
the conflict.’ The remainder of this chapter concentrates on the other dimensions. 
 
 
                                                        
23 A SOL survey (2002) identified that 67 per cent of Catholics attend religious services at least once per week 
compared to 39 per cent of Protestants.  The figures for daily prayer were 58 per cent and 41 per cent 
respectively. 
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COMMUNITY RELATIONS 
 
Within working class divided communities in Northern Ireland, the influence of unionist 
and nationalist groups is immediately apparent. For many children and young adults these 
communities are where their encounters occur and levels of knowledge about events and 
other groups with whom they have at best limited contact internalised. Strong networks of 
inter generations and extended families in areas consolidated by perceived threats of attack 
add to peoples’ attachment and sense of identity embedded within the locality (Connolly and 
Healy 2004). Spatially, within these communities, opposing British and Irish flags are 
prominent, streets are decorated in red, white and blue or green, orange and white and murals 
decorating house gable end walls depict slogans and scenes of mythology, martyrdom, heroes 
and victory and demonise the ‘other’ (Dillon 2004, Rolston 1991). Graffiti is also prominent 
in the Palestinian territories. Particular groups and actions are promoted and rivals, Jews, 
Israel and the United States denounced (Abu-Amr 1994, Oliver and Steinberg 2005). Violent 
deaths have become part of common experiences, graphically represented within local 
cultures that are permeated with the concept of martyrdom. Across the Palestinian territories, 
suicide bombers posthumously become heroes and heroines, commencing with a public 
funeral. On walls and lampposts, ‘martyr of the month’ calendars and pocket sized cards 
showing images of martyrs are prominent and individuals immortalised within pre attack 
visually recorded ‘living wills’ and children’s chanting. These rituals of communal 
affirmation are designed to translate into collective effervescence, to develop and reaffirm 
collective identifications based both upon the heroism and sacrifice of ‘our’ heroes’ and the 
brutality and injustices of the ‘other’. Such symbolism is therefore strengthening 
identification with the ‘we’ community and distance from the ‘other’.  
There are numerous social consequences to these developments within communities. 
Over time, ways of thinking and behaving about ‘our’ communities and the ‘other’ has 
become routinised, permeating the local culture and is a major influence upon formative 
development. There is particular concern over the extent these influences affect the 
development of children’s identity and the challenges this causes to contemporary perceptions 
of childhood. As Cairns (1987), Connolly and Healy (2004) and Fraser (1974) have shown, 
these processes have had a significant impact upon both Protestant and Catholic working 
class children. These children possess negative attitudes and prejudices towards the ‘other’ 
and play games depicting localised violence. In the past they frequently progressed to 
undertaking the activities for real as they become older. Lanclos (2003) notes how children’s 
play provides training that is often applied immediately or in the near future within the 
environment. Crucially internalisation commences very early in the child’s life. Children aged 
between three and four were discovered by Connolly and Healy (2004: 63) to recognise 
‘certain cultural events and symbols associated with their own community and are 
internalising preferences towards these.’ The impact of the environments continued 
throughout childhood resulting in children, particularly boys, identifying strongly with 
particular paramilitary groups. For these children segregation determined by sectarian 
categories was considered to be inevitable. And although the children were exposed to new 
information and encounters and gained greater awareness of historical events and political 
issues and ideologies as they matured, these tended to be interpreted ‘in a way that tends to 
confirm and explain their existing experiences’ (Connolly and Healy 2004: 64).  
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The socialisation processes of children in the Palestinian territories also develop and 
reinforce social divisions, demarcations that are arguably even more firmly rooted and rigid 
than their Northern Irish peers. There are a number of reasons for this. Many children become 
involved in youth groups associated with militant groups, are playing Intifada, fantasizing 
over their deaths and becoming martyrs. Children are growing up with the constant fear of 
attack, sharing the sense of incapacitation, with disrupted education and limited career 
prospects. These conditions result in many children developing post-traumatic stress disorder 
which can cause severe emotional problems and lead to neuroticism, high risk taking and low 
self-esteem (Elsarraj 1997, Moughrabi, Post et al 2003, Victor 2004). It is also worth noting 
that important formative stages of today’s younger adults occurred when they were children 
of the first Intifada with many participating in stone throwing and demonstrations. Within 
these environments violence has been normalised. Relationships with Israelis are dominated 
by perceptions of the conflict with little or no opportunity for Palestinians in the territories to 
meet Israeli citizens which would help breakdown the stereotypes and ignorance that exist 
between the two populations.  
 
 
PHYSICAL DIVISIONS AND BEYOND 
 
Across the two regions, demarcations exist within rural areas, towns and cities, as 
mentioned above, that create physical separation between communities and contribute to the 
ethnic religious processes of identification being applied to specific geographic milieu. 
Spatial divisions of the populations can also be found within particular regions and sub 
regions reducing opportunities for everyday social contact. Within Northern Ireland, the 
religious denominations are concentrated in particular areas, with Catholics being based in 
parts of Belfast and western parts of the province, and Protestants tending to be located within 
other areas of Belfast and Antrim, Down and Armagh in the eastern part of the province. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the physical separation has not reduced markedly since the cessation of 
violence, exemplified by the existence in 2004 of 26 barriers, ‘peace walls.’ The barriers are 
designed to physically divide the two populations with most of the walls being erected after 
the Good Friday Agreement (McDonald and Cusack 2005). Demarcation is not restricted to 
geography. On the contrary it continues to extent into childhood friendships and later 
relationships with the overwhelming majority of marriages in the province being 
endogamous. Within sporting activities, the denominations tend to engage in different sports, 
with Catholics associated with Gaelic games and Protestants with cricket, rugby and hockey 
which are closely connected to British traditions. There are some sports in which both 
populations participate. Football is the most popular but is riddled with sectarianism with 
teams divided according to community loyalties and intense rivalry often spilling over into 
violence that involves not only opposing teams but supporters (Coulter 1999). 
Within the Palestinian territories, social relationships between Muslims and Jews are 
severely restricted, dominated by military/militia or military/civilian interactions with little or 
no mechanisms for social or cultural interaction. The physical divisions have been rigorously 
applied across the territories with Jerusalem split according to religious denomination and 
Jewish settlements heavily fortified. In the Palestinian territories, the restricted mobility 
across socio-economic categories and heavily concentrated populations means that the middle 
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classes are also closely integrated within the conflict; a point reflected by the high proportion 
of well educated people who become suicide bombers. And following the collapse of the 
peace process, the onset of the second Intifada in 2000, construction of what is variously 
called the "separation barrier," "security fence" or "apartheid wall" within the West Bank by 
the Israeli government, and concomitant collapse of economic interaction and employment 
opportunities, mutual contact points between Palestinians and Jews in the territories have 
further receded. For all the communities involved in both territories, this physical separation 
has contributed to greater ignorance, ‘suspicion, fear and ultimately the potential for sectarian 
violence’ (Murray 1995: 219). After violence became commonplace, siege mentality formed 
within the communities and created a further rigid division to overcome.  
 
 
TRANSMITTING RELIGIO-NATIONALISM 
 
Across the respective communities, people have internalised religio-nationalist values 
and beliefs in conditions that place considerable emphasis upon communal identities and 
loyalties. With limited geographical mobility, particularly for the poorly educated, peoples’ 
social networks tend to be restricted to their area and consist of religious institutions and 
family and friends who share similar experiences and life chances. The intensity of these 
localised networks contributes to the development of strong attachments both to the areas and 
social relations and conversely maintains de-attachment from the ‘other’ across generations. 
The longevity tends to contribute to its legitimacy becoming part of local customs and 
integral to social identity that emphasises inner group similarity and outer difference. 
Religion is the most immediate source both of unity and division and is taught most explicitly 
through religious institutions.  
Within the Palestinian territories, the physical landscape is dominated by mosques and 
associated buildings. After generations of diminishing authority, these religious institutions 
have an increasingly important socialising role. These buildings, like churches, are meeting 
places for cultural, political and religious purposes and are integral parts of the social and 
community infrastructure. Within mosques, collective memories and myths are shared with 
many imams undertaking socialisation, lambasting the West and Israel and advocating the 
fight for Islam. Hamas and Islamic Jihad both have arrangements in place to recruit members 
at religious institutions (Burdman 2003). It should however be stressed that many imams are 
not militants and oppose acts of violence. Mosques more generally also have an important 
role to play within the broad spectrum of religiosity with worship and religious festivals 
generating bonds of solidarity and symbolism across the territories. They are also 
environments in which people meet and socialise within an atmosphere of religiosity. Both 
militant and moderate preachers are therefore contributing to greater range and depth of 
religiosity within the territories.  
Involvement by religious leaders and preachers within the Catholic clergy is by 
comparison more ambivalent. Protestant unionists24 tend to consider that ‘the Roman Catholic 
Church…dominates Irish politics and social life,’ (Davis 1994: 118). Yet republicans have 
largely viewed the same institution to be antagonistic to the cause since the nineteenth century 
                                                        
24 The most vitriolic and consistent critic of Catholic clergy has been Ian Paisley. Perhaps most notoriously, in 1972 
he claimed that the Roman church was ‘drunk with martyrs’ blood’ (quoted in Davis 1994: 132). 
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(Davis 1994, Morrow 1995). These differing perspectives highlight the dilemmas that the 
Roman Catholic hierarchy face within Northern Ireland. Davis (1994) suggests the clergy’s 
engagement with national governments and the nationalist community restricts their options 
and they cannot be seen to either defend the union with Britain or support a united Ireland. 
And when exploring the past, ambiguities can be noticed. When under British control, at one 
level, there was intense pride in the achievements of Catholicism. Nevertheless as Fitzpatrick 
(1988) remarks, this did not result in inevitable support for nationalism. At a senior level the 
bishops tended to be extremely conservative and were more concerned about secular 
nationalism than they were about British governance. Yet contrary to opinions within 
loyalism and republicanism, employees of the Catholic Church have not responded 
homogenously to the Troubles. For example, republicanism has been endorsed by some 
priests. Overall though, sentiments tend to reflect the difficult balancing of opposing interests 
and criticism has been directed across this spectrum at Republican, loyalist and British army 
acts of violence,25 particularly from cardinals, bishops and on occasion Pope John Paul II.  
Conversely the Church of Ireland has contributed to the maintenance of sectarianism 
despite this lack of active support for republicanism and to a lesser extent nationalism. The 
church’s functions, processions and celebrations have tended to be embedded within symbols 
and procedures, emphasising common religious identities within gatherings, and by extension 
in Northern Ireland, nationalist. Symbolically Catholicism in Northern Ireland is also strongly 
associated with dying and mourning processes which are again designed to solidify 
community ties and loyalties. When the cause of death is violent attack by a member of the 
‘other’ the church becomes integral to the process of mourning, bringing together people 
under the auspices of God to remember and mourn. And against a conflict and emotive 
backdrop, through services and collective gatherings, both fear and hostility can be generated, 
usually unintentionally. As Irvine (1991) MacDonagh (1983) and Morrow (1995) detail, 
priests share dilemmas and connect with the concerns, experiences and prejudices of 
congregations but rarely address them. Yet ironically this lack of confrontation has resulted in 
loyalists arguing that the performance of the last rites on paramilitaries and the reluctance to 
excommunicate, awards these people implicit Catholic church approval.  
Beyond the mosque and church, religion has also permeated other social processes 
involved in identity formation, commencing with the family. Within the Palestinian 
territories, children are exposed to Islam from birth, with people ‘born Muslim’. Since 1948, 
there has been widespread support for national liberation which is communicated from adults 
to children. After religion became more widely practised during the 1980s, children were 
exposed to greater piety and devotion. Signs of religiosity are more noticeable beyond the 
growing number of mosques and increased attendance levels. ‘Morality squads’ have become 
visible, patrolling the streets and confronting perceived irreligious behaviour, appearance and 
institutions, for example, places of gambling and alcohol (Oliver and Steinberg 2005). 
Bearded men and veiled women are much more prominent and religious practices are more 
noticeable within social relations. Family lives, and the perceived role of women within, have 
increasingly been influenced by Islamic interpretations and religion provides behavioural 
frameworks for adults and children. And because Islam has grown in popularity as a political 
                                                        
25 For example, during the 1980 Hunger Strike, Davis (1994) points out that there was support for some of the aims 
of the strikers but not the methods.  This instance highlighted one of the central disputes between the clergy 
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discourse, there is also considerably more emphasis upon religion beyond individual identity 
and outside the private sphere. At a practical level this can be noticed in the widespread 
penetration of Islamic social services and at an extreme political level, through the emergence 
of groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad and their association with acts of violence.  
Across the territories, the ways in which childhood is penetrated with images, and 
rhetoric, of violence is striking. Oliver and Steinberg (2005) report on babies and toddlers 
dressed and photographed as suicide bombers, children marching with ‘toy’ bomb belts 
attached to their chests and emotive posters of children in distress facing death and freedom 
that are widely displayed. These factors have contributed to children being socialised in more 
radical contexts. Normative levels of religious practice within familial environments have 
shifted to standards that would previously have been considered immoderate and incorporate 
strong opposition to the role of Israel and Jews and its perceived contribution to the problems 
that Islamic believers were encountering. Unsurprisingly enhanced religiosity and associated 
denigration of the ‘other’ has permeated familial socialising processes and in many instances 
has resulted in various family members recruiting relations to be suicide bombers (Victor 
2004).  
A number of studies have highlighted how Irish history and sense of ‘Irishness’ 
interwoven with Catholicism and cultural values are transmitted across generations by 
families. These processes help to perpetuate and reinforce hostility against the ‘other’ 
(Fairweather 1984, MacDonald 1991). It is the family that first introduces children to 
Catholicism and often this introduction also includes discussion about Protestants. A Young 
Life and Times Survey (2004) showed that the family was the most important source of 
information about the ‘other’ religious community. Different studies discovered that family 
members have introduced children to the Troubles in a prejudicial manner, teaching them 
negative aspects of the religious ‘other’ and encouraging sectarianism. A number of young 
people have recalled how their parents encouraged them to participate in riots and petrol 
bombings, for example, ‘My father told me stories of when he was younger he bricked da 
prods (British] now it has passed down through the generation to me and my brothers and 
sisters’ (McLaughlin et al. 2006: 610).26 Within these conflict areas, McLaughlin et al. (2006: 
611) suggest that the inter-generational transmission of ‘opinions and beliefs was often 
construed as a form of protection and aimed at maximizing family safety and security.’ 
Taylor and Quayle (1994: 42) remark that ‘the family connections that emerge when 
discussing terrorist organisations are considerable.’ This is borne out when examining the 
republican linage of the prominent paramilitaries of the Troubles, particularly within the IRA 
with the parents and grandparents of many being involved in previous IRA military 
campaigns and the Anglo-Irish war. Gerry McGeough, a convicted IRA member, provides an 
illuminative account when describing his childhood where Republican resistance, 
 
was something which I certainly was very conscious of from a very early age and 
something which instilled considerable pride in me. The fact was that I was of this Gaelic 
Irish stock which had for generation after generation resisted foreign rule in our country 
(quoted in Taylor 1998: 37).  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
and republican movement, namely the willingness of the latter to accept death for the broader social goal while 
the former emphasise the sacredness of life. 
26 See also Smyth et al (2004).  
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The significance of extensive family ties is expounded by Taylor and Quayle (1994: 42) 
who suggest that events carried out within families, often across generations, connect the past 
with the present. Such events and accompanying narrative can become the cornerstone for 
legitimising terrorism. ‘The present therefore has continuity with the past, and the young 
person growing in this environment absorbs the ethos of terrorism as part of his early 
socialisation.’ However transmission of nationalist, religious or republican values and 
behaviours were not necessarily intended. McLaughlin et al. (2006: 610) report on their 
research into Catholic adolescent views about religion, ethnicity and group identity. In their 
study, they discovered that parents were often not deliberately trying to teach their children 
about religion and ethnicity. Instead ‘everyday activities assisted in inadvertently reinforcing 
difference and division.’  
Like the processes of socialisation in non conflict regions, the radicalisation of younger 
Catholics and Muslims is not simply an intergenerational phenomenon, not least as children 
are actively involved in the construction of their identities. Post et al (2003) discovered that 
the majority of both secular and Islamic Palestinian ‘terrorists’ came from families whose 
levels of activism were average or less. In the study, it was discovered that just over 30 per 
cent of militant Muslims and 15 per cent of secular ‘terrorists’ attained similar beliefs from 
their families. Thus close to 70 per cent of militant Muslims developed their more extreme 
religious interpretations from other socialising agents. In Northern Ireland, many members 
originated from families that were apolitical, unsupportive of republicanism and who were 
subsequently shocked and even horrified when they found out about their relatives’ 
involvement (Dillon 2004, MacDonald 1991, McDonald and Cusack 2005). And in many 
instances, as McDonald and Cusack (2005) report, in this example with respect to loyalists 
but which applies also to Catholic and Muslim communities, children can hold more sectarian 
views than the older generations, in part because unlike their parents and grandparents, they 
have rarely interacted with the ‘other’.  
Peer groups are also important socialising agents at various stages of radicalisation. 
Within these groups, individuals share encounters and discuss events. Peers are also 
influential within processes of identification and stigmatisation because of the different 
dynamics that form between individuals of similar ages. Across Muslim and Catholic 
communities young children play exclusively in the company of their religious and ethnic 
peers and quickly develop a sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’ that connects with familial messages. 
With little opportunity for less insular and more integrative interactions, this distinction 
becomes reinforced by other agencies like education and the media as the child matures. 
Social loyalties become associated with religious divisions and interactions within groups 
encourage conformity to sectarianism. For example, Ewart et al’s (2004) study of Northern 
Ireland’s young people identified that sectarianism resulted in them having ‘restricted social 
spaces’ with limited opportunities to develop cross community friendships. Peer pressure was 
also instrumental in the participation of sectarian behaviour and the formation of same-
religion friendships. Decisions to join clubs, societies, cults and even ‘terrorist’ organisations 
can also be influenced by peers. Recruitment into Palestinian ‘terror’ cells is also strongly 
influenced by friendship networks, with friends often responsible for introducing individuals 
into militancy, vouching for their trustworthiness and reliability. For example, Olimpio27 
reports on the Hebron football club that provided eight suicide attackers out of its team of 
                                                        
27 Olimpio’s study is discussed in Ricolfi (2006). 
Development of Northern Irish Catholic and Palestinian Muslim National Identities… 23
eleven players. Attacks on friends by the ‘other’ have also been important motivating forces 
behind individual processes of radicalisation through generating feelings of anger, hatred and 
a desire for revenge. 
Imprisonment has also been instrumental in strengthening collective nationalist and 
religious identities. Abu-Amr’s (1994) examination of Palestinian Islamic extremism, 
including recruitment in prisons and Post et al’s (2003) study of prison found that the peer 
group was of considerable influence in the intensification of religious belief and for some the 
decision to undertake ‘terror’ activities. Similarly the imprisonment of republican 
paramilitaries within Northern Ireland resulted in ‘political’ prisoners freely associating, with 
the time and opportunity to discuss and develop political issues and ideologies that may not 
otherwise have been possible outside. In these environments, loyalties and commitment to the 
cause were often further strengthened (Adams 1996, Dillon 2004, Taylor 1998).  
Educational institutions like schools, adult education centres and libraries across 
communities are also important in the transmission of religious and associated nationalist 
norms and values that become integral components of identities, particularly for younger 
generations. Governments sought to implement secular criteria that needed to be internalised 
with particular levels of competence achieved and measured through qualifications. These 
systems of learning would deliver graduates capable of undertaking the required roles that 
would enable the nation-state to develop. And at the level of the hidden curriculum, they 
would contribute to the development of modern, rational identities. The internalisation of 
these forms of knowledge became central to individual progression. McCrone (1998: 47) adds 
that the main purpose of schooling was to ‘imbue pupils with the new patriotism… . This can 
be seen in the mobilisation of “national” history, geography and the “national curriculum.” 
The continuing, and in the Palestinian territories increasing, influence of religion and 
opposing ethnic loyalties can be noticed within a range of national school curricula. Smith 
(2003) identified that within these settings, religion is used to help define and underpin ideas 
and policies and reinforce national loyalties. In some respects, the intentions connect with 
Gellner’s (1983) view that cultural homogenisation occurs as schools are introduced across 
territories teaching the dominant language and emphasising national loyalties.  
For the two case studies, it is immediately noticeable that the forms of nationalist 
doctrine that are espoused contradict that of the dominant ‘other’. This is because within these 
settings social boundaries are routinised or institutionalised, overwhelmingly segregated 
according to religious affiliation and include sectarian images and messages. For example, 
Burdman’s (2003) study into Palestinian children and martyrdom discovered numerous anti-
Semitic statements demonising Jews and references to a religious obligation to sacrifice and 
the fight for ‘Palestine’ within school literature. When discussing why people joined the first 
Intifada MacDonald (1991: 85) was informed, ‘Everyone was angry, especially at school 
because there we learned that the whole world was free except us.’ Some teachers have also 
been associated with the recruitment of pupils to undertake acts of political violence (Victor 
2004). In higher education, many student associations are dominated by militant Muslims and 
leaflets and posters are widely distributed within campuses. Both lecturers and student 
movements have central roles in recruiting support amongst their peers in places of higher 
education like al-Najah University.28 Radical teachers are employed in private and public 
                                                        
28 Al-Najah University is considered to be the most radical institution, supplying at least 135 suicide bombers 
between 2000 and 2003 (Victor 2004).   
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schools and prove instrumental in providing meaning and explanation for religious and 
Palestinian experiences. Lessons often discuss past and recent events, the superiority of Islam 
and denunciation of Israel, Jews and the West. At the opposing end of the learning spectrum, 
Oliver and Steinberg (2005: 60) discuss revolutionary fervour within kindergartens and songs 
and chants that children are taught that promote violence against America and Israel and 
identify the Jews as having stolen ‘our country.’  
Within the Palestinian territories, political parties and religious groups place considerable 
emphasis on controlled learning. This connects into Islamic groups’ emphasis upon da’wa, ‘a 
call to God’ through preaching and proselytising that seeks to reshape individual 
consciousness. As part of this remit, Hamas has delivered religious education through 
mosques, schools, summer camps, evening classes, sports clubs and youth groups as a long-
standing integral part of its approach to conflict (Abu-Amr 1994, Esposito 2002, Levitt 2006). 
For Hamas, jihad to attain independence requires ‘the propagation of Islamic consciousness 
among the masses on all local, Arab and Islamic levels… It is necessary to instil in the minds 
of the Muslim generations that the Palestinian problem is a religious problem and should be 
dealt with on that basis.’ Children are given ‘an Islamic education based on the 
implementation of religious precepts, on the conscientious study of the Book of Allah…’ 
(Hamas 1988). As part of this approach, there is considerable penetration of Islamic learning 
institutions within the territories. Religion is now prominent across types of learning 
institution with schools29 and universities heavily influenced by militants.  
Education and the broader schooling experience have also been instrumental in the 
formation of sectarian identities within Northern Ireland. For Whyte (1986) defining and 
reproducing ethno-religious demarcations is endemic within the education system. Over the 
last 30 years, there has been a dramatic increase in opportunities within higher and further 
education. However within schooling, the demarcations to be found within wider society 
continue to be replicated and have been prominent within institutions of education since at 
least the 1820s. And when the island was partitioned, separate schools were established in the 
north. Each denomination became associated with different sports, music and literature and 
both the formal and hidden curricula connected explicitly with the respective populations 
(Coulter 1999, Davis 1994, Gallagher et al 2003). Eighty years after partition, these divides 
remain with 96 per cent of primary educated Protestant children attending a Protestant school 
and 94 per cent of their Catholic peers attending Catholic schools (reported in Gallagher et al 
2003).30  
In Catholic schools pupils are informed, as one respondent told Cañás Bottos and Rougier 
(2006), ‘right from the start: “Catholics are right and Protestants are wrong...[the priests] were 
very cumbersome, the majority of them and they instilled a fairly anti-British idea.’ These 
schools are ‘imbued with a Catholic religious atmosphere and imbibe an Irish nationalist 
version of history’ (Irvine 1991: 193). It is therefore unsurprising that alongside the formal 
school curriculum Catholicism litany and scripture is espoused. Songs, ballads, dances and 
stories continue to be performed grounded in nationalist traditions and customs. And at what 
may initially appear to be a more superficial level, school uniforms are distinctive between 
the denominations. The significance of this however goes beyond differences in colours or 
                                                        
29 The PA’s Ministry of Education estimated that in the Gaza Strip, 65 per cent of educational institutions below 
secondary level were provided by Islamic institutions (International Crisis Group 2003).   
30 For secondary school attendance the figures were slightly reduced. 
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design, the uniforms strengthen collective identification and expose individuals to sectarian 
attacks (Smyth et al 2004). The impact of the curricula within schools is much debated and 
shares some commonalities with the broader debate about the role of formal education. 
However in Northern Ireland, Gallagher (1995) argues that irrespective of this wider debate, 
segregation in schools emphasises group differences and reinforces ignorance and suspicion. 
It has since been acknowledged that ‘unless the children meet and learn about each others’ 
traditions at school, the odds are against a peaceful and secure future in this country’ 
(Integrated Education Fund 2003: 2). In order to achieve this, integrated schools have been 
introduced. However the policy has struggled, with limited popular appeal and only three per 
cent of primary school children are attending these institutions.  
The last socialising agent to be discussed is the media which has been influential in the 
development of distinct ethnic religious identities since the development of ‘modern’ printing 
forms and the advent of publishing houses. By the middle of the nineteenth century, Donnelly 
(1980) identifies the roles of Catholic Irish and Ulster British publishing houses and 
widespread availability of newspapers, pamphlets and books in the development and 
reinforcement of distinctive identities. During the Troubles, the media has provided images 
and information and many paramilitaries, particularly republican, have delved into history 
books to help understand and legitimise their struggles. Today while international types of 
media are prominent within Northern Ireland, newspapers, magazines and books that are 
predominantly designed for one of the populations remain popular and widely available. 
Media sources have also been utilised and owned by paramilitary organisations to 
communicate with their supporters and to generate greater community support. In addition to 
the intentional purposes of the media, there is the unintentional consequence of news 
reporting. Cairns (1987) has analysed television news reporting and found that the emphasis 
on incidents associated with the Troubles led to an over concentration of violent images and 
terms with inadequate attention placed upon contextualising the items resulting in inflated 
fears and hatreds. This would not necessarily be problematic if the media was not many 
children’s main source of information about the Troubles (Cairns 1987 and Connolly and 
Maginn 1999).  
Similarly within the Palestinian territories, the media has been influential in identity 
formation generating support for greater religiosity and nationalist commitment. From the 
1990s onwards, advancements in communicative technology have aided the transmission of 
images, reports and discussions through satellite technology that have mobilised support both 
within the region and beyond. Today, in addition to more traditional forms of media like 
newsletters, newspapers and children’s magazines, which tend to portray America and Israel 
negatively (Frisch 2003), militant religious groups also communicate through their own 
satellite station like Hamas’ al-Aqsa television. This is part of an attempt to overcome what is 
seen as global American and Zionist media control. Radio and television programmes are 
transmitted that support their religious discourse, providing narrative and images that 
reinforce the justification for greater religiosity within individual and collective identities and 
the nationalist struggle. Programmes are aimed at both adults and children, with the latter 
catered for by specialised programmes, cartoons, songs and music videos that promote 
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violence,31 the symbolism of childhood martyrdom32 and glorify suicide bombers (Oliver and 
Steinberg 2005, Victor 2004). Modern technology has also provided further opportunities to 
communicate messages, values and through the internet within websites and chat-rooms 
(Aouragh 2003, Bunt 2003). Through these different methods of communication, 
Palestinians, like the majority of the world, are now provided with information and graphic 
images about events and policies that can contribute to the widespread feelings of anger and 
incapacitation whilst reinforcing religious loyalties and antagonisms (Vertigans 2008a).  
 
 
LEGITIMISING FACTORS  
 
Socialisation processes can be seen to be providing Palestinian Muslims and Catholics in 
Northern Ireland with religious loyalties that are connected to political and community 
allegiances and the maintenance of Jewish and Protestant ‘others.’ However, these processes 
do not operate in isolation. To be instrumental in the psychological separation between the 
groups, the messages and symbols have to be legitimised (Vertigans 2008a, 2008b). In the 
Palestinian territories this happens through interpretive knowledge about a combination of 
historical and recent events. These include at a broader level the formation of Israel, the 
inability or reluctance of the international community or Arab nations to address concerns 
diplomatically or through warfare and the failure of secular ideologies to achieve Palestinian 
liberation and deliver sustainable development in the territories. At an individual level, 
religious and political messages have been legitimised by personal or friends’ experiences 
including humiliation at omnipresent roadblocks, isolating towns and villages, death, arrest or 
detention of family members and friends, employment restrictions, malnourishment and 
poverty and desire for revenge.33 The cross cutting nature of these issues helps explain the 
diverse support base34 for more radical forms of Islam.  
Across Catholic communities, religio-nationalist loyalties are legitimised and 
strengthened within a range of similar similarities in experiences. These include pervasive 
patrols and partisan military operations, curfews and internment which were often 
experienced as ‘raiding and wrecking homes and precious possessions, dragging children 
from their beds, abusing women, beating men and boys’ (Fairweather et al (1984: 15). 
Because of this emphasis upon the roles of the British army and RUC, nationalists felt their 
communities to be under siege. In these circumstances in Northern Ireland and elsewhere, 
solidarity was reinforced as a defensive mechanism and on the reverse, British policy and 
                                                        
31 For example in a Palestinian TV programme recorded on 2 May 2001 the narrator tells seven and eight year old 
children that ‘The time for toys and games is over, throw away your toys, pick up rocks’ (quoted in Burdman 
2003: 103). 
32 Burdman (2003: 104) draws attention to a clip shown on PATV in 1998 which showed a military camp for 
children who repeated after the coach ‘Children of my country, I am the suicide squad.’  The highly sensitive 
death of Mohammed al Dirrah at the start of the second intifada, has also been dramaticized on Palestinian 
television.  In the post death scenes the boy informs his father ‘I shall go to my place in heaven, how sweet is 
the fragrance of the Martyrs’. 
33 Further information about these feelings can be found in Khosrokhavar (2005), Post et al. (2003) and Victor 
(2004).  
34 For instance the popularity of Hamas is spread across poor areas, municipal and professional associations, 
chambers of commerce and student associations with leaders including religious officials, professionals and 
technocrats.   
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presence was de-legitimised and animosity of the Protestant ‘other’ enhanced. Donohue 
(2000) explains that measures like arbitrary detention and the demarcation of a suspected 
community sustained Catholic grievances, deterred many individuals from assisting the 
British and contributed to the radicalisation of others. These events and encounters tended to 
be concentrated within working class zones which were predominantly divided according to 
denomination. Nevertheless although middle class homes were less likely to encounter such 
extensive army presence and police tactics, their effects crosscut socio-economic boundaries. 
The relatively small population and geographical proximity means that most people, 
irrespective of socio-economic classification, have known people who have been harassed, 
injured, arrested and in some instances killed and adversely affected by the economic 
problems and limited employment opportunities that occurred throughout the Troubles. In 
summary, the mobilisation of support and legitimisation of paramilitary actions and rhetoric, 
was a consequence of multiple factors that included economic, social, cultural, political and 
military experiences. 
 
 
SOCIAL BOUNDARIES FOR PERSONAL  
EXPERIENCES AND COMMON HISTORIES 
 
Within Northern Ireland and the Palestinian territories, the above analysis identified a 
range of social processes through which a sense of communal identity formed for the 
‘excluded’ groups. This is not to state that the individuals involved shared the same identity. 
What they did share was a sense of collective identity based values derived from ethnicity and 
religion interwoven within a framework of nationalism. In other respects there is considerable 
difference between individual identification that includes gender, racial, socio-economic, 
habits, emotions, education and generational loyalties. These allegiances also influence 
discursive consciousness and have to be negotiated along with national connections and very 
different perceptions of what that means and how these feelings are to be extended from 
individual and groups into territories.  
Common history across the regions is also widely shared and contested by the ‘other’. 
Indeed interpretations of history can often be traced as the roots for the stigmatisation of the 
rival group. Elias and Scotson (1965) have outlined how perceptions of the past can be 
instrumental both in sustaining a sense of group solidarity in the present and the longevity of 
social and psychological boundaries. By connecting with the past, groups’ discourse gains 
continuity and feelings of shared fate that transcend generations, ensuring that the socially 
constructed barriers and unifiers continue, in many instances, long after the original 
cultivators have died. For Elias and Scotson these distinctions became embedded within 
stereotypes which were used by the powerful ‘established’ to denigrate the ‘outsiders’ based 
around characteristics of ‘group disgrace’ in order to protect their identities and status and to 
which could be added resources. ‘Outsiders’ were all categorised according to the ‘minority 
of the worst’ with the behaviour of the least desirable characters applied to the whole group. 
The reverse of this negative stereotyping, is unsurprisingly positive. The established based 
their self-perceived superiority upon their common histories and a ‘minority of the best’ that 
stemmed from the most highly regarded aspects associated with the group; less desirable 
features were overlooked. Consequently the ‘established’ collective identity was based both 
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upon their own identified sources of ‘group charisma’ and characteristics applied to outsiders 
who compared unfavourably and which became the basis for their stigmatisation. Gossip was 
an integral part of these dynamics, reinforcing positive group feelings and negative images 
about the ‘other’. In Elias and Scotson’s study of a town in the English midlands the emphasis 
was upon informal social dynamics between two distinctive groups within the working class. 
One group ‘the villagers’ were able to retain a sense of superiority over people who lived in 
the ‘estate’ and who in some respects, internalised the ‘established’ perceptions. Sutton and 
Vertigans (2005) adapted this explanatory framework to help illuminate some of the 
processes behind the stigmatisation of radical Muslims but extended the application because it 
was argued that attempts to create ‘group disgrace’ can be unsuccessful and often 
unintentionally contributed to a greater sense of ‘group charisma’ among ‘outsiders’. Some 
parallels can be drawn with the development of conflict in the two territories. 
Both in Northern Ireland and the Palestinian territories, common memories that revolve 
around lost territory, the ‘others’ aggression, international injustice and hypocrisy are fused 
within ‘group disgrace’ and processes of stigmatisation that are very much based upon the 
‘minority of the worst’. For the Palestinians, the Israeli Defence Force became representative 
of Israel. Hass (2003: 151) suggests that ‘for this generation, Israel is no more than a 
subsidiary of an army that knows no limits and settlements that knows no borders.’ Similarly 
for Irish nationalists, loyalist paramilitary and the British army were to exemplify Protestants 
and the British. The categorisations share a tendency to concentrate upon perceived levels of 
violence, discrimination and excessive and unwarranted intrusions into lives and communities 
that arouse emotions which provide further stimuli for collective solidarity and distinctions. 
The same processes have also been instrumental in creating and strengthening ‘outsider’ 
group solidarity and a sense of communal identity frequently around the legacy of ‘common 
history’, symbols and cultural ways of life that are considered to be attacked or threatened. By 
formulating group allegiance in part through comparison with the ‘other’ unity is achieved 
and means that internal differences reduced in magnitude through the emphasis on the 
‘minority of the best’ and minimised by comparison with the “others’ minority of the worst.” 
And unlike Elias and Scotson’s outsiders, Palestinian Muslims and Northern Irish Catholics 
have not internalised negative self-images but from positions of weakness with regards to 
national power, possess superior self identification that connects closely to common histories. 
Even during colonialism, as O’Farrell (1975) remarked, while the English sought to 
emphasise the alleged inferior, uncivilised barbarity of the Irish Catholics in order to justify 
their domination, such attempts at stigmatisation tended to fail. On the contrary, Irish 
Catholics would respond by emphasising their levels of religiosity, scholarship, saints and 
monasticism. Arguably by challenging British attempts to impose ‘group disgrace’ the 
Catholics’ ‘group charisma’ strengthened and became established within nationalist culture 
even when Ulster became the dominant and prosperous part of Ireland pre partition and 
Protestants prospered, considerably assisted by discrimination in education, employment and 
legislation. By comparison, Catholics’ resources and positions had both diminished and were 
underdeveloped. Connections are made with periods when their ethnic and religious group 
was dominant and events which emphasised military or moral superiority. Emphasis upon 
morality and sacrifice is particularly interesting because these are images that are drawn not 
from episodes that are successful in a military context but as examples of sacrifice and the 
willingness of group members to give up their lives on behalf of the wider community. An 
obvious example would be the 1981 hunger strikes in Northern Ireland, discussed above. The 
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deaths reinvigorated the republican movement and as a consequence mobilised massive 
support for the opposing loyalists whose own interpretations of the event as ‘common history’ 
were very different. By focussing upon the reciprocal dynamics that interweave historical and 
contemporary common memories, the outsider groups are able to establish the markers of 
identification for their own ‘charisma’ and the established’s ‘stigma’. The same processes 
provide mechanisms through which to understand and explain the perceived injustices and 
atrocities encountered and help reinforce the processes of collective solidarity and enmity and 
by extension the prospects for peace. In addition to the experiences of subjugation and 
perceived injustices, images and narrative of ‘Golden Ages’ can also be invoked which 
connect with peoples ‘common histories’ and which provide the basis for the future.  
 
 
PROSPECTS FOR PEACE 
 
Within Muslim and Catholic communities, it has been established that religio nationalist 
identities have been socially constructed through a range of socialising processes that provide 
the basis for identification. Nevertheless nationalist identities are not immutable or as Todd et 
al. (2006: 341) point out polarisation and conflict ‘is not rooted in a primordial and 
unchanging ethnicity: it is rather a question of the triggers and resources for identity shift … 
.’ National identities may be rooted individually and socially but within flexible, evolving 
relations and communities that both enable and constrain. Consequently identities change 
through reflexivity and negotiating local, national and international cultural, economic, 
political and social processes and activities. In other words, shifting figurations within 
ongoing socialisation can result in shifting perceptions of self and common history, levels of 
national consciousness, group demarcations and commitment to peace. What were once 
clearly defined and widely accepted boundaries of identification can become blurred and the 
distance between groups diminishes.  
Today, Northern Ireland is slowly progressing along a route to peace. It is extremely 
unlikely that peace between the Palestinians and Israelis will be achieved for the foreseeable 
future. Optimism is greater within Northern Ireland, in part because paramilitaries 
representing both Catholics and Protestants were losing community support, experiencing 
conflict fatigue and high profile acts of violence were increasingly seen to be counter 
productive. Neither the Israeli government nor leading Palestinian groups have reached this 
conclusion. In addition, Northern Irish society is more closely integrated with, and influenced 
by, the international community, immersed within the European Union and processes of 
globalisation. Kerr (1996) comments on how the globalisation of culture has impacted on the 
province, with much music, literature and sporting allegiances originating externally and 
being shared across the communities. Globalisation has also impacted upon greater 
integration within employment. Sectarian employers like the ship builders are increasingly 
disappearing and multi-national organisations locating to the region have no interest in 
religious loyalties. Consequently these incoming organisations are not making appointments 
based upon sectarian connections. McLaughlin et al’s (2006) study reflects this, identifying 
that religious identity is no longer considered to be significant in relation to employment or 
workplace behaviour. Therefore the extent of discriminatory practices within employment has 
significantly reduced. By comparison, international investment in the Palestinian territories is 
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low, there is little confidence and trust in international political institutions and global cultural 
representations are increasingly dominated by religious images and symbols. These factors 
have contributed to feelings of anger, frustration and desperation that exceed the excesses 
encountered during Northern Ireland’s Troubles. These feelings and experiences are allied to 
increasingly popular interpretations of Islam that seek to legitimise violence in the cause of 
Palestinian nationalism with militants extolling the virtues of martyrdom and salvation on 
behalf of the nation.35 The growing influence of absolutist forms of Islam makes compromise 
even harder to attain. Religion is therefore instrumental in the conflict in a way that is not 
noticeable in Northern Ireland, although Catholicism has contributed to an atmosphere of 
distinction, separation and maintenance of the collective identities that paramilitaries emerged 
from and utilised. 
The strengthening of religio-national identities within socialising processes in conditions 
that are seen to justify violence, suggest that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will not be 
resolved without major international engagement and shifts in approach both from the Israelis 
and Palestinians. In Northern Ireland, socio-economics and the political situation have 
improved yet there are grounds for considerable caution. Sectarianism remains prominent 
across generations as Leonard’s (2006) study of teenagers in Belfast showed. The Peace 
Agreement has not addressed these processes, indeed on the contrary it has been criticised for 
providing the two communities with ‘autonomy over matters of central concern to their sense 
of identity … endorses social segregation … giving equal legitimacy to “British” and “Irish” 
cultural identities … in “separate but equal” terms (Wilford 2001: 60-1). And while 
McLaughlin et al. (2006) showed that employment practices had changed, religious identity 
remained instrumental within the individual, familial and group spheres. Mutual processes of 
stigmatisation have been routinised within everyday life and continue to be communicated 
daily through gossip and institutions across generations. This is partly because physical 
separation between communities continues and impressions of the ‘other’ are based upon 
‘common histories’, indirect relations or the behaviour of the ‘minority of the worst’. Yet in 
both regions demarcations have been recently reinforced by the increase in the ‘peace walls’ 
and apartheid/security wall/fence. Segregation across communities, schools and cultural 
activities are reinforcing exclusivity and difference when inclusion and commonalities are 
required if peace is to become firmly embedded. Peaceful overtures have to also overcome 
generations of socialisation processes that provide senses of support and belonging and social 
barriers. People have internalised a fusion of religion, historical events, images and symbols 
and recent cultural, political, social and economic experiences and widespread destruction, 
injuries and killings committed by the ‘other’. In other words much greater attention needs to 
be placed on addressing the social processes that continue to contribute towards the 
internalisation of fundamentally opposing norms and values across the regions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
35  Discussed in more detail in Khosrokhavar (2005), Vertigans (2008a; 2008b) and Victor (2004).   
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CONCLUSION 
 
Recent experiences within Northern Ireland and the Palestinian territories have clearly 
differed. While the former appears to be on a peace trajectory, the latter remain firmly rooted 
in conflict. Both territories have concentrated peoples in relatively small geographical areas. 
In such environments, it is easier to identify and communicate what the people share and how 
they differ from the ‘other’ than within huge nation-states or across the world in trans-
national organisations. Through regular interaction, intermingling and shared experiences and 
memories, social processes become embedded with narratives and practices and collective 
identities can be reinforced and sustained. The nature of the related socialising processes is 
non conformist in comparison with universally recognised nation-states whose socialisation 
aims for individuals to internalise dominant norms, values and practices on which the stability 
of societies rely. However in the discussed regions, the outsider processes of identification 
construe and define beliefs and behaviour that challenge the established status quo while 
conversely remaining loyal to localised expectations. The legitimacy of this opposition and 
the breadth of nationalist support are heightened if contemporary experiences connect with 
‘common history’ that helps to construct and constrain experiences and behaviour and the 
attribution of charisma and stigma. In the process, previous and long lasting accounts of 
repression and injustice and a lineage of protest and sacrifice are provided that justify the 
challenge.  
Religious institutions, norms, values, behaviour and perceptions are integral to these 
community loyalties, group unification and the struggle for national independence. Processes 
commence during childhood with children exposed to deeply rooted beliefs that are 
communicated by a range of institutions including family, friends, media and schools. Many 
children have, and continue to, internalise sectarian discursive consciousness because this has 
been legitimised at a number of levels and remains so throughout adulthood. And because of 
the pervasive nature of the nationalisms, the level of internalisation of these challenging, if 
not confrontational, precepts will determine the extent to which the individual will be 
assimilated within the outsider group. Thus it is only by holding values that would ensure 
their ostracism from the established that individuals will attain acceptance and a sense of 
solidarity with outsiders. If peace in Northern Ireland is to become permanent and introduced 
within the Palestinian territories, groups must become convinced that peaceful political 
participation is the most appropriate way forward, be willing to negotiate with the support of 
their communities and in the longer term breakdown the stereotypes of the ‘minority of the 
worst’. In Northern Ireland the first two stages have been reached yet concerns remain about 
the likelihood of overcoming rigid divides and different common histories when the 
communities continue to be separate. By comparison, the prospects for peace over the 
Palestinian territories have regressed with no Israeli or Palestinian political party possessing 
the popular mandate to be able to resolve the seemingly intractable problems which are 
further complicated by the increasing religiosity and the inherent difficulties of negotiating 
over matters through the prism of absolutism. This intractability is further reinforced by the 
ongoing evidence both sides accumulate about the ‘minority of the worst’ which strengthens 
still further their processes of stigmatisation. In other words, the prospects for the Palestinian 
territories look extremely bleak. 
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